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This paper reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets.
We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage–risk prediction of adverse selection
theory—that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis
of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance
markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage–risk correlation
may be found in some pools of insurance policies but not in others. We also review the work on the
disentangling of adverse selection and moral hazard and on learning by policyholders and insurers.
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Adverse selection exists in an insurance market when buyers of insurance have 
information about their risk that the insurers who underwrite their policies lack and use this 
information in making their insurance purchases. The policyholder may be better informed about 
either the probability of a loss, the distribution of the size of the loss in the event that a loss 
occurs, or both. This paper offers a survey and an evaluation of the vast empirical literature on 
adverse selection in insurance markets.  
Although substantial work has been done on adverse selection outside insurance markets, 
we focus on the insurance context for several reasons. First, the term “adverse selection” itself 
originated in the context of insurance and the insurance market has been the locale for some of 
the earliest economic theorizing about it (Arrow (1963), Pauly (1974), Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976)). In presenting the Nobel Prize to Joseph Stiglitz, Professor Jörgen W. Weibull cited the 
concept of adverse selection by noting that “[a] prime example can be found in insurance, where 
companies usually offer alternative contracts, where higher deductibles may be traded off against 
lower premiums. In this way, their clients are, by their own choice of contract, effectively 
divided into distinct risk classes.”
1  
Second, insurance markets offer a relatively good setting for the empirical testing of 
adverse selection theory, thanks to the quality of the data available to researchers who study such 
markets. In other contexts in which adverse selection may take place, the quality of one party to 
a contract, and the information available about this quality to her counterparty, is often “soft” 
and unverifiable. Consider, for example, a labor market in which the ability of an employee may 
be better known to the employee herself than to her employer. In this case, even a researcher 
who has full access to the employer’s written records may be unable to observe the quality of the 
employee’s work because this work may be combined with that of other employees to produce 
output. The researcher may also be unable to observe what the employer knows about the 
employee’s quality, as this information is often not fully reported in the employer's written 
records. In contrast, a researcher with full access to an insurer’s records has all the information 
that the insurer has about the customer’s risk when selling the insurance policy, as well as the ex 
post realization of policyholders’ risks.
2
                                                 
1 See http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/presentation-speech.html.  
2 Of course, the insurer in turn does not have all the information that is available to policyholders, such as 
driving speed and miles driven in the case of auto insurance. Such information as the insurer does have, 
however, often exists in a form that can be, and in some cases has been, made available to researchers. 
  1Third, as we show below, the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets is quite 
large,
3 and the existence and magnitude of adverse selection in insurance markets is of practical 
and policy significance. All this makes adverse selection in insurance markets a worthy topic for 
a survey in and of itself. 
The basic prediction of adverse selection theory concerns the correlation between 
insurance coverage and risk. Under this prediction, policyholders who are known to themselves 
(but not to their insurer) to be high-risk will tend to choose higher insurance coverage (lower 
deductibles); thus, coverage and risk are expected to be positively correlated. This coverage–risk 
correlation has been the major focus of empirical work in this area. 
Below we review a large number of studies that test for the presence of a coverage–risk 
correlation. We group the studies by the insurance market on which they focus: (i) automobile 
insurance, (ii)  annuities, life insurance, and reverse mortgages (all products that center on 
mortality risk), (iii) long-term care, (iv) crop insurance, and (v) health insurance. A coverage–
risk correlation has been found for some markets but not for others, and for some pools of 
insurance policies in a given market but not for others.  
Facing a corpus of studies of which only some find the predicted coverage–risk 
correlation, researchers who comment on empirical work in this area have pronounced the 
evidence “mixed,” “inconclusive,” or “ambiguous.”
4 We arrive at a different assessment. We 
argue that one should not expect the question of whether a coverage–risk correlation exists to be 
answered identically in all insurance markets or even in all pools within a market. Thus, one 
should not regard studies that reach opposite conclusions about the existence of a coverage–risk 
correlation as necessarily in conflict with each other.  
Rather, we argue, the existing body of empirical evidence, informed by theoretical 
reasoning, provides good reasons to expect the existence of adverse selection to vary across 
markets and, indeed, even across segments of the same market. Whether and to what extent 
adverse selection exists should be expected to depend on the type of insurance product involved, 
the buyers’ characteristics, and institutional and regulatory factors. A main focus of our survey is 
on distinguishing and discussing factors that vary across insurance markets and policy pools in 
their existence and magnitude, possibly leading to the absence of coverage–risk correlation in the 
data. The factors that we discuss are (i)  the absence of useful private information, (ii)  the 
existence of private information for some but not all policyholders in a market, 
                                                 
3 In 2005, for example, insurance carriers and related activities accounted for 2.4 percent of US GDP (see 
http://www.iii.org/economics/national/gdp/). 
4 See, for example, Löfgren et al. (2002)), which is partly based on materials accompanying the award of 
the Nobel Prize for work on asymmetric information. 
  2(iii)  policyholders’ inability or failure to use the private information that they have, (iv)  the 
presence of superior information or predictive power on the part of the insurer, (v) propitious 
selection resulting from interaction between risk and risk aversion or other policyholder 
characteristics associated with an increased tendency to purchase insurance, and (vi) institutional 
arrangements. 
In our view, researchers who do empirical work in this area should not think of 
themselves as participating in an effort to resolve once and for all the question of whether 
adverse selection and the coverage–risk correlation exist. We are on solid ground in believing 
that such a correlation does exist in some markets and policy pools but not in others. Future work 
in this area would do best to address itself to the question—on which some progress has already 
been made—of how to identify the circumstances under which one may expect the coverage–risk 
correlation and adverse selection to arise. We hope that our survey will provide a conceptual 
framework for this kind of thinking about empirical work on adverse selection in insurance 
markets.  
Although we devote substantial attention to empirical work on the coverage–risk 
correlation, we also review work on two additional issues. While a coverage–risk correlation 
may not arise despite the presence of adverse selection due to factors that we discuss below, it is 
also true that a coverage–risk correlation may arise due to moral hazard even in the absence of 
adverse selection. Therefore, we review the empirical work on the disentangling of moral hazard 
and adverse selection. In addition, while many studies focus on informational asymmetries at a 
particular point in time, the information about policyholders’ risk types that policyholders and 
insurers possess may be at least partly produced by learning over time. We also discuss the 
empirical work that relates to such learning.  
Before proceeding, we wish to stress that adverse selection has important implications for 
policy, and is not only of interest to economists. The theory of adverse selection has had an 
important effect on insurers, government regulators, and courts.
5 To illustrate, as of August 
2007, there were more than 130 state and federal opinions in U.S. courts that discussed adverse 
selection, in all types of insurance markets, from pension guarantees
6 to long-term disability 
insurance.
7 Concern about adverse selection in health insurance has prompted courts to permit 
marketing practices—such as paying downstream firms a bonus not to carry a rival’s product—
                                                 
5 For more detailed discussion of the policy significance of adverse selection arguments, see Siegelman 
(2004). 
6 Borntrager v. Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pens. Fund, 425 F.3d 1087 (8
th Cir. 2005). 
7 Currie v. Group Insurance Commission, 290 F.3d 1 (1
st Cir. 2002). 
  3that would otherwise constitute clear antitrust violations.
8 Similar concerns led the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission to allow employers to exclude persons with disabilities 
from employer-provided health insurance if the inclusion of such persons would result in 
“unacceptable adverse selection.”  
Given public officials’ receptivity to arguments based on the existence of adverse 
selection, it is unsurprising that policy advocates have made substantial use of such arguments. 
Priest (1987) argued that the U.S. insurance “crisis” of the mid-1980s, in which certain kinds of 
liability insurance commanded sharp premium surges or were withdrawn altogether, was 
produced by an adverse selection death spiral that resulted from “judicial compulsion of greater 
and greater levels of provider third-party insurance for victims …”
9 Romano (1989) proposed a 
similar adverse selection story to explain the “crisis” that befell the market for Directors and 
Officers liability insurance at roughly the same time.  
Importantly, policymakers and policy advocates have in the past relied primarily on 
theoretical models or predictions of adverse selection. Our thesis—that the basic prediction of 
stylized adverse selection models will be manifested in some circumstances but not others—
indicates that future policy discussions on this subject should avoid relying on the general 
possibility of adverse selection. Policy analysis for a given market should try to rely on an 
empirical study of that market, or at least, absent such a study, should attempt to analyze, based 
on the lessons of the existing body of empirical work, whether the market has the characteristics 
that have been found to give rise to adverse selection and a coverage–risk correlation.  
Earlier surveys on which we build are Dionne and Doherty (1992), Cutler and 
Zeckhauser (2000), Chiappori (1999, 2000), Dionne, et al. (2000), Chiappori and Salanié (2003), 
Dionne, Doherty and Fombaron (2000), and Hall (2006), but we stress work done in recent 
years. In addition, we differ from earlier surveys in our focus on the heterogeneity of insurance 
markets and on the identification and discussion of factors that can explain the absence of 
adverse selection or a coverage–risk correlation in some insurance markets or to subsets of 
policies within them.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the coverage–risk 
correlation prediction. Section III reviews empirical tests of the prediction in various insurance 
markets. Section IV discusses factors that may lead to the lack of such a correlation in data for a 
given insurance market or set of insurance policies. Section V focuses on efforts to disentangle 
                                                 
8 Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 692 F. Supp. 
52 (D.R.I, 1988). 
9 Priest (1987, at 1524). For critiques of this argument, see sources cited in Siegelman (2004, n. 29). 
  4empirically moral hazard and adverse selection. Section VI discusses empirical work on learning 
by policyholders and insurers about policyholders’ risk types. Section VI concludes.   
II. PREDICTING A COVERAGE–RISK CORRELATION 
A. Prediction 
  The theory of adverse selection in insurance markets was introduced by Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976) and has since been developed and extended in many ways. In the basic adverse 
selection model, agents have private information about expected claims that insurers do not have, 
and insurers compete with each other. In the standard setting (which corresponds to reality in 
most lines other than life insurance), agents must purchase insurance exclusively from one 
insurer among those competing in the marketplace. 
Although the theoretical literature is quite rich and offers adverse selection models that 
differ in significant ways,
10 one prediction that the models make—what we call the coverage–
risk correlation—appears to be fairly robust and arises in a wide range of circumstances 
(Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2006)).
11 Since insurers cannot distinguish between 
high-risk and low-risk agents, the two groups must be offered the same prices for insurance. 
Given that the two groups face the same prices, their different risks will lead them to act 
differently. In particular, high-risk agents can be expected to purchase more insurance. When 
insurers offers menus of insurance contracts (policies), the coverage–risk correlation can be 
expected to manifest itself in a tendency among high-risk agents to choose contracts that offer 
more comprehensive coverage (e.g., lower deductibles). When insurers offer a single product, 
the coverage–risk correlation can be expected to manifest itself in a greater tendency among 
high-risk agents to purchase insurance.  
Having clarified how higher coverage may manifest itself, we should also explain the 
ways in which higher risk may manifest itself. For the purposes of the coverage–risk correlation, 
we refer to an agent as having higher risk if she or he generates higher expected insurance 
payouts due to a larger number of expected claims, a higher expected payout in the event of a 
                                                 
10 For a survey and discussion of adverse selection models, see, for example, Dionne, Doherty, and 
Fombaron (2000). 
11 In a recent theoretical contribution, Koufopolous (2007) identifies some circumstances in which this 
correlation does not arise. In his model, “if some agents choose zero coverage, there can exist separating 
equilibria that exhibit negative or zero correlation between coverage and the accident probability.” And 
“if there are multiple loss levels, .  .  . the positive relationship between coverage and the accident 
probability . . . may not hold true even if all equilibrium contracts offer strictly positive coverage and 
administrative costs are zero.” 
  5claim, or both. Agents may, of course, have private information about either of these 
components.  
It is also important to emphasize that the prediction of a coverage–risk correlation implies 
that coverage will be correlated with risk, controlling for all relevant policyholder characteristics 
that are observable to the insurer. These observable characteristics allow the insurer to place 
policyholders in different risk classes. What the insurer cannot do in the presence of information 
asymmetry is distinguish between higher-risk and lower-risk agents who belong to the same risk 
class on the basis of on their observable characteristics.
12  
B. Testing 
Insofar as the researcher has access to insurers’ information about policyholders, a 
natural way to test the coverage–risk correlation is to run a regression of the following type: 
ii Risk Coverage Xi i α βγ =+⋅ + ⋅ + ε
                                                
, 
where   is a variable representing the ex post realization of policyholder i’s risk, 
is a variable representing the policyholder’s i’s choice of coverage, and   is a vector 
of all policyholder’s characteristics that are known to the insurer and potentially relevant for 
classifying his or her risk. Dionne, Doherty, and Fombaron (2001) note that it would be 
preferable to use expected coverage rather than actual coverage in the foregoing specification in 
order to address problems of non-linearities or misspecifications.  
i Risk
i Coverage i X
 
12 In the standard adverse selection model, the insurer uses all relevant policyholder characteristics that it 
can observe in making its pricing decision. Accordingly, policyholders who are riskier, according to their 
observable characteristics, will have no reason to buy more coverage since they will be charged for such 
coverage at an appropriate rate. There is evidence, however, that insurers do not always incorporate all 
relevant information into their pricing decisions. Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) show that British insurers 
do not take policyholders’ residential addresses into account in pricing, even though this information 
helps to explain mortality risk after controlling for other observables. They suggest that the failure to use 
this information is attributable to social or political pressure by the public against basing annuity prices on 
such “extraneous” information. In a study of farm insurance, Makki and Somwaru (2001) show that 
information about policyholders’ yield and revenue in the preceding ten years is not fully used in pricing 
even though it is available to the insurer and predicts future risks. In such situations, one may predict not 
only (i) that coverage will be correlated with risk, controlling for observables, but also (ii) that coverage 
will be correlated with observables associated with risk and not used in pricing. Finkelstein and Poterba 
(2006) find evidence consistent with the latter prediction. 
  6The left-hand side of the equation may be a continuous variable such as the total cost of 
insurance payouts or the cost of insurance payouts in the event of a claim; it can also be a 
dichotomous variable, such as the number of claims, or a dummy indicating whether a claim was 
submitted. This approach has been long and extensively used in the literature.  
An alternative approach, introduced by Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2000) and 
subsequently used by others, is the bivariate model. The bivariate model uses two equations that 
are determined either simultaneously or sequentially. In the insurance context, one equation 







Coverage f X i






Since the two equations are determined together, the correlation between the residuals of 
each of the regressions can be estimated. If the correlation is statistically significantly different 
from zero, then the two regressions are determined simultaneously. If the correlation is found to 
be zero, then each of the regressions may be estimated separately. Therefore, finding a positive 
correlation between the two residuals is consistent with a coverage–risk correlation. It may be 
shown that these two parametric models are equivalent under general conditions. The major 
differences between them depend on the distributional assumptions made conditional on the 
covariates.  
Chiappori and Salanié (2000) also suggest a non-parametric test that is meant to 
overcome the relatively restrictive functional forms used in the two approaches presented above. 
Their fully nonparametric procedure is based on χ
2
 tests for independence. They create 2
m
 “cells” 
constructed from m exogenous dummy variables. For each cell they compute a 2  x  2 table 
generated by two dummies variables—coverage, which is equal to 1 if high and 0 otherwise, and 
risk, which is equal to 1 if the policyholder had a least one accident and 0 otherwise—and then 
use several methods to test for the independence of coverage from risk (conditional on being in a 
given cell). 
C. Issues 
1. The Need for Full Access to Insurer’s Information 
In assessing the extent to which the coverage–risk correlation may be tested adequately 
by a study, it is important to know whether the researcher had full access to all information that 
the insurer used in classifying applicants and setting prices. In the automobile insurance context, 
for example, early studies such as Dahlby (1983), Dahlby (1992), and Puelz and Snow (1994) 
  7had less information than the insurer did, whereas recent works such as Cohen (2005) and Saito 
(2006) are based on access to all insurer data. Insofar as a study uses only some of the 
policyholder information that is available to the insurer, a coverage–risk correlation may be 
found due to characteristics that are observed by the insurer but not by the researcher and are 
correlated with both higher risk and the tendency to choose higher coverage.  
2. Claims vs. Accidents 
Another problem that researchers need to take into account is that not all accidents/losses 
lead to the submission of claims. In particular, choosing a higher level of a deductible may 
prevent the submission of a claim that would be submitted if a lower deductible were chosen. 
Thus, to test whether higher deductibles are correlated with lower risks, it would not make sense 
to count all claims submitted by high-deductible and low-deductible policyholders. Since low-
deductible policyholders are able to file claims for accidents that cause too little damage to claim 
under high-deductible policies, a researcher who counts all claims reported by low-deductible 
policyholders would find that this group submits more claims even if both groups are identical in 
their risk type. One approach in such a case, used by Cohen (2005), is to look only at claims that 
can be submitted by both groups of policyholders, i.e., claims exceeding the high deducible 
level.  
Furthermore, policyholders may sometimes be reluctant to submit claims for accidents in 
amounts that barely exceed their deductible level. They may elect not to submit such claims in 
order to avoid the transaction costs involved in submitting a claim and/or to avoid having a 
record of a claim that may lead to an increased premium in subsequent years (Hosios and Peters 
(1989)). Therefore, to study whether high-deductible policyholders are riskier than low-
deductible policyholders, Cohen (2005) also examines the correlation between deductible 
choices and claims that exceed the high deductible level by a considerable margin (100%). 
Dionne and Gagné (2001) develop an econometric model to account for the possibility of 
policyholder reluctance to submit claims exceeding the deductible. They stress that the threshold 
above which a policyholder will report a loss may be specific to each individual—e.g., the cost 
of filing a report may depend on the value of each individual's time—and should be considered a 
personal deductible. This deductible is observable neither to the insurer nor to the researcher.  
3. Additional Unobservable Differences among Policyholders 
Although we discuss these issues in detail below, we should flag a series of problems that 
surface once we relax some key assumptions of the basic adverse selection model. In this basic 
model, the only significant information about policyholders that is unobservable to insurers 
  8concerns policyholders’ risk. In reality, however, there may be additional and important 
differences among policyholders that are unobservable to the insurer. 
First, there may be unobservable differences in policyholder characteristics, such as the 
level of risk aversion, that affect choices of insurance coverage. Insofar as there are 
characteristics that are associated both with choices to buy higher insurance coverage and with 
lower riskiness, they may neutralize or reverse the positive coverage–risk correlation that the 
pure adverse selection model predicts. We discuss this issue in detail in Section IV.  
Second, there may be unobservable differences in policyholders’ precaution levels, i.e., 
differences in “hidden actions.” In particular, policyholders who have more insurance coverage 
have less incentive to take precautions that can reduce risk. Thus, moral hazard may itself 
produce the positive coverage–risk correlation that adverse selection may be expected to 
produce. Accordingly, while the finding of such a correlation is consistent with adverse 
selection, it is also consistent with, and may be fully due to, moral hazard, as Dionne et al. 
(forthcoming) stress. We discuss empirical attempts to disentangle adverse section and moral 
hazard in Section VI.  
III. EVIDENCE OF THE COVERAGE–RISK CORRELATION 
This section reviews the empirical evidence that relates to whether a coverage–risk 
correlation exists. While the theoretical analysis of contracts under asymmetric information 
began in the 1970s, by which time the adverse consequences of hidden knowledge were already 
widely accepted, the empirical testing of the models began only in the mid-1980s. Since then, 
however, as we describe below, much work has been done on a variety of insurance markets.  
We divide our review by type of insurance market. We consider, in turn, automobile 
insurance (Subsection A), annuities, life insurance, and reverse mortgages, all of which center on 
mortality risk (B), long-term care (C), crop insurance (D), and health insurance (E).  
Table 1 lists all the studies we discuss in this section, grouped by type of insurance. For 
each study, the first column indicates whether the study found evidence of a correlation between 
the level of coverage purchased by the policyholder and the risk posed by the policyholder. 
Additional descriptive information (type of insurance studied, data used, whether the authors had 
access to all information available to the insurer) is also provided, along with a brief summary of 
the conclusions.  
  9A. Automobile Insurance 
In the automobile insurance market, three initial studies suggested the existence of a 
coverage–risk correlation, but their findings were challenged by subsequent research. Dahlby 
(1983) and Dahlby (1992), the first two studies on the subject, did not have individual data on 
coverage. Puelz and Snow (1994) used individual data and also found adverse selection. Dionne, 
Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001) criticized Puelz and Snow for failing to take nonlinear effects 
into account and reported (using different data) that the insurer’s risk classification was sufficient 
in the sense that there was no residual adverse selection in each risk class in the insurer’s 
portfolio, once nonlinear effects were accounted for.  
In a well known study of the French auto insurance market, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) 
found no correlation between risk and coverage. This study focused on a relatively homogeneous 
group of about 6,000 “beginning drivers” with one to three years’ experience. The researchers 
had almost all the information that the insurer used to set premiums, a complete profile of the 
types of insurance contracts chosen by policyholders,
13 and characteristics of the accident(s) for 
which the policyholder claimed coverage from the insurer, if any. They tested for adverse 
selection using five variants of the coverage–risk correlation test, including (i)  estimating 
independent probit equations for (a) the type of contract purchased and (b) the probability of an 
accident, and testing whether the residuals are correlated; (ii) estimating the two equations above 
as a bivariate probit and directly testing whether the estimated correlation parameter is zero; and 
(iii) a variety of discrete non-parametric methods, based on testing whether, conditional on the 
values of the most-important explanatory variables, loss probability and type of coverage are 
independent of each other in contingency tables. All of these procedures yielded the same 
conclusion: those who are more likely to submit claims do not buy more insurance. 
Richaudeau (1999) examined the choice between basic third-party coverage and 
comprehensive insurance (which covers third-party liability plus damage to the policyholder’s 
own vehicle in at-fault situations). His data, culled from a survey of French drivers, include 
observations on the total number of accidents experienced by each policyholder (whether or not 
these accidents were reported to the insurer) and a great deal of information about individual 
policyholders and their cars, including total miles driven per year. Positive correlation was first 
tested by running a probit regression on the decision to purchase comprehensive vs. basic 
                                                 
13 In France, auto insurance is sold in two broad categories: a mandatory contract covering only third-
party liability and a broader optional contract that also covers first-party losses to the policyholder herself 
and her vehicle, even if she is at fault. Although optional contracts come with a variety of deductibles, 
Chiappori and Salanié simplified the analysis by looking only at the choice between the minimum 
mandatory coverage and any type of expanded coverage. 
  10insurance. The error term in this equation measures the policyholder’s riskiness after controlling 
for observed variables that explain the choice of insurance plans. The results were used as an 
explanatory variable in a second equation that explains the number of accidents in which the 
policyholder was involved, fitted by a negative binomial model. The test for asymmetric 
information is whether the residual from the insurance equation significantly explains the 
number of accidents, and Richaudeau finds that it does not. He also finds, however, that without 
controlling for the total miles driven by the policyholder (which insurers do not know), the 
coefficient is close to statistically significant. He concludes that a modified version of adverse 
selection may be at work: those who drive more are more likely to purchase comprehensive 
insurance even though they are not at the higher risk per mile driven. This is not the intrinsic risk 
that is typical of most adverse selection models, but neither is it insurance-induced risky 
behavior (moral hazard). 
Cohen (2005) obtained results suggesting that Chiappori and Salanié’s finding of no 
coverage–risk correlation may have been due to their focus on beginning drivers. Cohen studied 
the Israeli insurance market, focusing on all new customers of a single insurer, and enjoying full 
access to all insurer data about the customers. Using methodologies essentially similar to those 
of Chiappori and Salanié, Cohen found no correlation between coverage and accident risk for 
beginning drivers (those with fewer than three years’ experience) but did find a sizeable and 
statistically significant correlation for drivers with more than three years’ experience. Among 
policyholders who were recent customers of the insurer (but had more than three years of 
experience on the road), the average number of claims was 36 percent higher for those who 
chose the low deductible than for those who chose the standard deductible. This finding was 
robust to controls for the insurer’s entire information set. For example, the probability of having 
submitted at least one claim (in an amount exceeding the larger deductible) was about 4 percent 
higher for low-deductible policyholders, even after controlling for all policyholder and vehicle 
characteristics. 
Consistent with the possibility that customers with significant driving experience may 
have private information, Cohen (2005) found that customers with a bad record with the insurer 
that she studied were more likely to “flee their record” by switching to another insurer.
14 Since at 
that time Israeli insurance companies did not have access to verifiable information about 
policyholders’ claims records at other companies and official accident records, the ability to 
switch insurers provided policyholders who had bad records with a potential information 
advantage. Indeed, the study found that policyholders who switched insurers were 
disproportionately likely to have poor claims histories and, presumably, hoped to select against 
                                                 
14 Boyer and Dionne (1989) established that a policyholder’s prior claims record is a good predictor of 
future risk.  
  11their new insurer by pooling with other new customers who had better claims histories than 
theirs.
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Saito (2006) studied the Japanese auto insurance market in a period immediately after 
extensive deregulation. Using the bivariate probit technique, Saito concluded that there was only 
a very weak and insignificant positive correlation (for both beginning and experienced drivers) 
between crash risk and the purchase of own-vehicle coverage, even when controlling for all 
variables observed by the insurer. There was a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between crash risk and the purchase of a zero-deductible policy. Although the insurer did not use 
geographic data in setting prices, Saito found that drivers in high-risk prefectures were not more 
likely to purchase zero-deductible or own-loss policies than those in low-risk prefectures, which 
again suggests little information advantage for policyholders.  
B. Annuities, Life Insurance, and Reverse Mortgages 
We group these three insurance products together because all of them cover risks closely 
connected with mortality or longevity, although the last—reverse mortgages—involves more 
than pure mortality risk.  
1. Annuities 
Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) were among the first to investigate selection in the 
market for annuities, concluding that annuitants outlived otherwise-similar non-annuitants. Two 
recent studies by Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) and one by McCarthy and Mitchell 
(forthcoming) find evidence of an information asymmetry in favor of annuitants. Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2002), who focus on the UK, and McCarthy and Mitchell (forthcoming), who examine 
the US, the UK, and Japan, use a roughly similar methodology that compares the aggregate 
mortality risk of annuitants with that of non-annuitants using standardized life tables. Annuities 
are typically priced on the basis of age and gender only; annuitants are not asked whether they 
smoke and are not required to undergo a medical exam. Thus, if annuitants outlive age- and 
gender-comparable non-annuitants in the aggregate, this result will not be an artifact of the 
insurer’s ability to make finer classifications than econometricians on the basis of variables that 
the latter do not observe.  
                                                 
15 The findings of this study with respect to experienced drivers do not indicate that one should expect to 
find a coverage–risk correlation in the French automobile insurance market studied by Chiappori and 
Salanié. Whereas Israel did not have systems for information sharing among insurers, French insurers do 
share information about the policyholder risks. The French system is explained in detail in Dionne, 
Michaud, and Dahchour (2007).  
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annuitants on average do outlive the same-age population at large. For example, McCarthy and 
Mitchell (forthcoming) found that the death rates of male voluntary annuitants were about two-
thirds as high as those of the same-age general population in the US and the UK, and about four-
fifths as high in Japan. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002), using somewhat richer data, detected 
selection not just on the purchase/no purchase margin but also by the type of annuity selected. 
For example, those who purchased annuities that included a payment to the annuitant’s estate in 
the event of early death did, in fact, tend to die sooner. 
Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) had more refined data, and could therefore examine 
several additional aspects of contract design. Using a single insurer’s complete records for 
42,000 individual annuity purchasers, they estimated hazard rates for mortality, conditional on 
various parameters of the annuity purchased and all other covariates known to the insurer (age, 
gender, etc.). They observed only a slight tendency for longer-lived individuals to purchase 
annuities with a higher initial annual payout, contrary to the prediction that a standard selection 
test would yield. (This conclusion obtained most strongly for those who purchased annuities 
voluntarily; some retirees are required by law to annuitize their savings, and there was stronger 
evidence of selection on payout size among these compulsory purchasers.)  
However, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) also find evidence that longer-lived individuals 
are more likely to purchase “back-loaded” policies—those in which a greater share of total 
payouts are made in later years (assuming that the annuitant survives) due to escalating nominal 
payouts over time. Such policies are obviously more advantageous to those who believe they will 
live longer than their insurer predicts. Another aspect of contract design on which selection may 
occur is the extent to which payments survive the annuitant’s death. Some contracts are 
structured so as to provide for guarantee periods, so that if the annuitant dies while the guarantee 
remains in force, the annuity continues to make payments to the annuitant’s estate for the 
remainder of the guarantee. As would be expected if annuitants self-select on this margin, 
Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) find that longer-lived individuals are less likely to purchase 
annuities that come with guaranteed survivor payments, since such guarantees are most valuable 
to those who die earlier.  
Reverse mortgages are annuity-like instruments that allow homeowners to remain in their 
homes and to borrow against the cash realized from the future sale of their homes (which often, 
but not always, happens due to their death). Although there are many home-rich but cash-poor 
elderly homeowners for whom a reverse mortgage should be attractive, the market has failed to 
develop. Davidoff and Welke (2005) consider the possibility that adverse selection has 
forestalled the development of this product. Such selection might occur if consumers have 
private information about their long life-spans, low mobility, or low appreciation rates for their 
  13homes, and use this information to speculate against the holder of the mortgage (who benefits 
from rapid departure in much the same way that an annuity issuer benefits if the annuitant dies 
earlier). However, using calibrated numerical simulations as well as the positive–correlation test, 
Davidoff and Welke decisively reject the possibility of adverse selection.
16  
In the context of reverse mortgages, the positive–correlation test requires homeowners 
with reverse mortgages to stay in their homes longer than those without such mortgages. 
Davidoff and Welke, using from 77,000 reverse mortgages covered by the US government's 
Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program as well as the American Housing Survey 
panel (for comparison purposes), find that HECM participants did not have longer life spans than 
the general population of the same age and gender, after controlling for observables. An 
alternative to the positive–correlation test asks whether reverse mortgage holders are more 
sensitive to increases in home equity values than non-participants. The authors find this to be the 
case, suggesting that favorable selection occurs because reverse mortgage borrowers are 
especially likely to have strong tastes for expenditures earlier in life (a higher discount rate).  
2. Life Insurance  
In contrast to the papers on selection in annuity markets, all of which find strong 
evidence of selection, those testing for the presence of selection in life insurance markets reach 
generally negative conclusions. This is puzzling since, as several of the authors note, both 
annuities and insurance involve the same risk—mortality—albeit with opposite consequences for 
the insurer. The apparent absence of selection in life insurance and its presence in annuities is 
difficult or impossible to explain if selection is based (only) on the policyholder's superior 
knowledge of his or her mortality risk. In that case, policyholders who know they will die sooner 
than their insurer believes should prefer to buy life insurance, and those who know they will live 
longer than their insurer believes should prefer to buy annuities. We return to this puzzle below. 
Cawley and Philipson (1999) used both US aggregate and micro data to produce three 
main findings, none of which supports the predictions of a simple adverse selection story. First, 
after controlling for age, gender, and smoking status, they found that the death rate for persons 
who had life insurance was lower than for those who lacked it. Second, they found that quoted 
life insurance premiums tend to fall, rather than rise, with higher levels of coverage. Such 
quantity discounts appear to be inconsistent with a significant role for adverse selection in life 
insurance, because most adverse selection equilibria require rationing, and rationing is possible 
                                                 
16The authors also examine moral hazard in the reverse-mortgage market. Although theory yields 
ambiguous predictions, the data strongly support the conclusion that having access to additional cash does 
induce most homeowners to remain in their homes longer than they otherwise would, but not by enough 
on net to overcome the positive selection effects discussed earlier. 
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Philipson showed that premiums per dollar of coverage fell with increased amounts purchased. 
The study also compared people’s self-assessed risk of death (based on interview data) with their 
insurer’s predictions, and their own insurance purchases. They found that the relatively risky are 
less, rather than more, likely to hold life insurance. They then estimated models to predict 
whether an individual would die during a given period, using age, gender, smoking status, and 
the person’s self-assessed likelihood of dying. After controlling for the level of a policyholder’s 
premium as calculated from life insurance tables—which reflects the insurer's assessment of the 
individual’s risk—they found no additional gain from knowing the policyholder’s self-assessed 
risk of death. 
McCarthy and Mitchell (forthcoming) compare mortality rates for policyholders and 
others in the US, the UK, and Japan, for several ages and for different types of insurance 
coverage, on the basis of aggregate mortality tables. They find that purchasers of life insurance 
(except in Japan) have substantially lower mortality risk than the population as a whole—a 
negative, rather than a positive, correlation between risk and coverage. They conclude that 
“Underwriters are relatively effective at screening out poor risks [and . . .] insurance companies 
can better assess mortality risks than can individuals themselves.” 
C. Long Term Care 
Long-term care insurance combines aspects of annuity and health insurance. Like the 
former, it provides coverage against the risk that one will outlive one’s assets by paying for 
nursing home care, which is often a large and burdensome expense for the elderly. (The average 
rate for a semi-private room in a nursing home in the US was more than $50,000 per year in 
2002.) Like the latter, it covers some medical expenses and also insures against long-term 
increases in medical costs, as ordinary health insurance does not. In the US, long term care 
outlays verged on $150 billion in 2004, representing a significant financial risk for the elderly. 
However, only about 10 percent of the elderly have a private long term care insurance plan 
(Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). If adverse selection has prevented the development of this 
market, as some have suggested, it may constitute a potentially serious welfare loss. The 
consensus, however, is that this seems not to be the case.  
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) study the US market for long-term care insurance on the 
basis of data from the Asset & Health Dynamics (AHEAD) survey of the elderly. The survey 
contains questions about preventive-care actions by individuals, and the authors assume that 
individuals who take more such actions are more risk-averse. Applying the positive–correlation 
test to the population as a whole, Finkelstein and McGarry find that those who purchase 
insurance are not at higher risk than the general population. However, when comparing 
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insurance companies’ assessments, they find that individuals do have residual private 
information. They explain this riddle by suggesting that two types of people buy this form of  
insurance, each with a different kind of private information: individuals who have private 
information about their risk type and individuals who have private information about their 
preferences. Individuals with private information indicating that they are at higher risk would 
show a positive correlation between risk and coverage. Those who have strong preferences for 
this insurance (Type 2s), however, tend to be less risky due to their psychologically cautious 
temperaments. In the aggregate, the behaviors of these two types may offset each other, causing 
the positive correlation to disappear despite the existence of asymmetric information about risk 
type.
17  
D. Crop  Insurance 
Crop insurance is unique among the insurance markets considered in this survey, since 
farmers presumably maximize some combination of utility and farm profits. Thus, Just, Calvin, 
and Quiggin (1999) decompose the motives for purchasing crop insurance into three 
components: a risk-aversion effect, a subsidy effect (in 1988, when the data were collected, the 
US government underwrote part of the cost of the crop insurance program), and an adverse 
selection effect that occurs if farmers can use private knowledge to speculate against their 
insurer. The study concludes that the risk-aversion effect is small and that farmers purchase crop 
insurance primarily to receive the subsidy or because of adverse selection possibilities.  
Makki and Somwaru (2001) use the positive–correlation test to examine adverse 
selection in an environment in which farmers are offered a variety of yield- and revenue-
insurance products. They use Generalized Polychotomous Logit techniques to explain farmers’ 
choices among four or five different insurance alternatives, some of which cover only yield risk 
while others cover revenue risk (caused by decreases in either yield or prices). Risk is measured 
retrospectively for each farm, using ten-year retrospective data on yields and prices to compute 
the probability that yield or revenue will fall below the amount guaranteed in the insurance 
contract. Insurers could presumably use the same data to compute premiums. Nevertheless, the 
authors find strong evidence that high-risk farmers prefer revenue insurance to yield insurance 
and individual insurance relative to group (county-based) insurance products, perhaps because 
farmers can predict their coming year’s efforts better than the insurer can. Moreover, for most of 
                                                 
17 A somewhat different interpretation of the study's findings is that individuals who undertake 
precautions tend to be more cognitively able, and cognitively-able individuals are more likely to purchase 
long-term care insurance. This explanation would also lead to a negative correlation between risk and 
tendency to purchase insurance.   
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risk farmers did.  
Sil (2005) considers the possibility of “endogenous” adverse selection in the market for 
crop insurance. Farmers can purchase insurance against declines in yield per acre and also have 
the option of selling some of their crop forward at a fixed price. Sil shows, theoretically, that 
having a forward contract leads a farmer to exert less effort in growing crops, regardless of 
whether or not insurance is also purchased. Since insurers do not observe whether policyholders 
also have a forward contract, heterogeneity among farmers creates a kind of endogenous adverse 
selection. Empirically, farmers who have forward contracts are more likely to choose more 
generous crop insurance than those who lack such contracts and also to experience larger insured 
losses (by about 6 percent), in keeping with the positive–correlation prediction.  
E. Health  Insurance 
There is a significant body of empirical work that finds evidence of adverse selection 
within health insurance markets, i.e., people in poorer health choose plans that offer more 
generous coverage. The empirical work on health insurance markets is discussed in detail in the 
review by Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000). That review notes fourteen studies that examine the 
selection of more expensive options within a given type of insurance plan, all of which find some 
type of adverse selection.
18 It also reports sixteen additional studies that consider other margins 
(e.g., whether a policyholder re-enrolls or decides to forego insurance), virtually all of which find 
information asymmetry in favor of policyholders. 
In one well known study, Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) offer a compelling analysis of 
intra-market selection, examining data from the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission 
and comparing employees who chose a more-generous fee-for-service plan with those who chose 
a less-generous HMO (health maintenance organization) arrangement. Those in the first group 
spent significantly more and were more likely to experience significant medical events (giving 
birth, having a heart attack) than were the HMO enrollees. In another widely noted work, Cutler 
and Reber (1998) study health insurance provided by one large employer, Harvard University, 
via several different plans. Harvard moved from subsidizing only the most generous plans to a 
fixed-dollar subsidy (regardless of the generosity of the plan chosen), increasing the annual cost 
for the most generous plan by roughly $500. The positive–correlation hypothesis was 
dramatically borne out: the most generous plan was abandoned by the best risks. For example, 
those leaving the generous plan for the HMO option were four to five years younger on average 
                                                 
18 Notably, however, there is also some empirical work on health insurance that finds no evidence of a 
positive correlation between risk and coverage. (See Buchmueller et al. (2004), Ettner (1997), and 
Browne and Doerphinghaus (1993).)  
  17than those who remained. Those who quit also had lower medical expenses than those who 
stayed.
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IV. FACTORS EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF COVERAGE–RISK CORRELATION 
A risk-coverage correlation appears to be a feature of some insurance markets or pools of 
insurance policies but not of others. Therefore, a good adverse selection theory must explain 
when a positive risk-coverage correlation will be present and when it will not. In this section, we 
discuss explanations for the diversity of results produced by the empirical evidence reviewed in 
the preceding section. We consider several explanations for why a risk-coverage correlation may 
not be observed, as well as the empirical support for these reasons.  
Section A focuses on reasons why policyholders may not have an information advantage,  
or may fail to use whatever advantage they have. Section B discusses factors that by themselves 
would lead to a negative correlation between risk and coverage and, thus, may have an offsetting 
effect on the positive risk-coverage correlation that adverse selection might otherwise produce. 
Finally, Section C discusses institutional and regulatory factors. 
A. Policyholders' Lack of Informational Advantage, or Their Inability to Use It  
1. Absence of (Useful) Private Information 
Theoretical models of adverse selection typically represent information asymmetry in a 
highly stylized fashion. Policyholders are usually assumed to have superior information about 
their own probability and/or size of loss. This, however, may be unrealistic in some contexts, 
such as the automobile insurance market. Chiappori and Salanié (2000) suggest that the lack of 
such superior information may explain their failure to find a risk-coverage correlation in their 
study of this market.  
To fix ideas, we can define individual i’s expected loss as  ( )( ) ( ii EL pX LY =⋅ ) i
                                                
, where 
X and Y are vectors of all of the explanatory variables (primitives) that define the probability and 
size of the loss, including variables whose values are unknown to both the insurer and the 
 
19 The generalizability of these findings is somewhat limited, however, by the fact that the selection was 
largely based on observable variables such as age. Even though age was observable, Cutler and Reber 
point out that the contractual relationship between insurer and employer forbade the former from taking 
age into account when setting premiums. This, by itself, “explains a large part of adverse selection.” Such 
a constraint, however, would not apply in many other contexts outside of employer-provided health care. 
Moreover, the ability to select among health insurance plans offered by the same employer is probably 
substantially larger than the ability to select across insurers in most other contexts. 
  18policyholder. For example, if the loss involves an automobile accident, X may include driver i’s 
temperament and aggressiveness, total miles driven, average speed, road congestion, and so on, 
and Y may include the make and model of the policyholder’s car.  
There are several ways in which a policyholder may possess imperfect information. First, 
she or he may not know some of the elements in the X or Y vectors, or may know them only with 
significant random errors and/or biases. Second, the policyholder may lack information about the 
functional forms that translate information about behavior or environment into estimates of the 
probability or size of loss. Finally, a factor not known to anyone—luck—may explain much of 
the variance in p or L across policyholders; thus, even perfect knowledge of some elements of X 
and Y and the functional form will not give policyholders a significant advantage over insurers in 
predicting expected loss.
20  
It seems plausible that policyholders may be ignorant of or mistaken about the underlying 
“primitives” that determine the probability or size of loss and how those compare with the value 
of these parameters for other policyholders. Consider automobile insurance. One might think that 
a policyholder could observe his or her own driving “style.” However, for the policyholder to 
have useful private information, she must also know how his or her driving compares with that 
of other drivers in the insured pool; it is not clear that drivers generally have this information. 
For example, Svenson (1981) found that 80 percent of all drivers believed that they were in the 
top 20 percent of safest drivers. Guppy (1993) found that British drivers tended to guess that the 
probability of their having an auto accident was lower than the probability of such an event 
befalling an average person of their age and gender. Moreover, those with prior convictions for 
speeding or drunk driving generally perceived themselves as less likely to have an accident than 
members of the non-offender group did.  
Even when these primitives can be assessed objectively, policyholders may not be able to 
translate them into a probability or dollar amount in order to accurately estimate their expected 
loss and compare it with their premiums in deciding how much coverage to buy. For example, it 
is clear that a major determinant in auto-accident risk is the total miles driven in a given year 
                                                 
20 Imagine the insurer running a regression in which the dependent variable is whether or not the 
policyholder experiences a loss and the right hand side variables are those in the  X  vector that are known 
to the insurer. Suppose the policyholder also runs this regression, using all elements of  X  that s/he or he 
knows (both public and private information). If the R
2 on the second regression is not much higher than 
the first, the insured’s extra information will not be very valuable because random factors (those not 
known to either party) will be responsible for much of the risk of loss. 
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21 This would seem to give policyholders an information advantage, since they 
know their own mileage better than their insurer does. Even so, however, the policyholder may 
not realize the importance of this variable as a determinant of his or her accident risk because he 
or she does not know the functional form of the relationship between miles driven and the 
probability of an accident. (Evidence suggests that drivers overemphasize their own skill and 
underemphasize miles driven as contributors to accident risk.)  
More directly, we can observe people’s proficiency in predicting outcomes in their own 
lives. The evidence is limited and somewhat mixed. For example, several direct studies of 
mortality risk suggest that people can do a reasonably good job of predicting how long they will 
live (Hamermesh (1985), Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos (2002)), while other recent work 
suggests that people do not forecast their own demise very accurately (Cawley and Philpson 
(1999), Bhattacharya, Goldman, and Sood (2003)). Extreme cases in which policyholders have 
accurate private knowledge of their impending mortality do seem to lead to selective insurance 
purchases,
22 but there is no reason to think these results translate readily to less extreme 
situations. 
The foregoing suggests that the key assumption of adverse selection—that policyholders 
have better information about their risk type than the insurer does—is not necessarily valid for 
all insurance markets and products. Future research should seek to identify the products and 
groups of policyholders where insurance customers can be expected to have useful private 
information.  
2. Private Information in the Possession of Some but Not All Policyholders 
Whether policyholders have private information that can yield a risk-coverage correlation 
depends, we have suggested, on the type of insurance product at issue. Such private information 
may exist with respect to some types of insurance products but not for others. For a given 
                                                 
21 Insurers do not typically ask for (or verify) detailed information on total miles driven (although it would 
arguably not be difficult to verify, and its use in setting premiums could lead to significant efficiency 
gains (Vickrey (1968), Edlin (2003)). 
22 The test for the gene that causes Huntington’s disease is extremely accurate and the disease is fatal and 
untreatable. Someone who tests positive for the genetic defect may well be tempted to buy substantial 
life-insurance coverage if he or s/he can do so without paying the much higher premium that h/is or her 
test outcome would warrant. Chiappori (2006) and Hoy and Witt (2007) analyze the selective effects of 
genetic testing for the BRCA1/2 genes that are implicated in breast cancer. Alternatively, consider USLife 
Credit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee (29 Wn. App. 574 (1981)), in which the policyholder—knowing that his 
wife had terminal cancer—obtained credit life insurance on seventeen loans taken out in her name, 
exploiting the fact that the credit life applications did not require any health declaration. 
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another subset who do not. In such a case, a risk–coverage correlation may be found if the 
researcher focuses on the first group alone. However, we would not expect to find a risk–
coverage correlation in the second set of policies and, if this group is sufficiently large, such a 
correlation may not be uncovered by a researcher who observes the set of all policies rather than 
the first set of policyholders with private information.  
That the existence of risk-coverage correlation may vary among subsets of policy pools 
within one insurance market has been shown by Cohen (2005). Examining the set of policies 
sold by a single insurer, Cohen finds that a risk–coverage correlation exists among those policies 
sold to drivers who have three or more years of driving experience, but not for those sold to less 
experienced drivers. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that private information 
sufficient to yield a risk-coverage correlation exists only when a new customer has enough 
driving experience before joining the insurer. Interestingly, they also suggest that customers 
cannot glean significant private information about automobile-accident risks from introspection 
or by observing their performance in other dimensions of life. Rather, it appears that only direct 
experience with one’s own driving can provide significant private information about one’s risk 
type, at least in the context of automobile accidents. 
Given the foregoing evidence, future research would do well not to limit itself to testing 
for a risk–coverage correlation within the entire set of policies available to the researcher but 
rather to conduct separate tests for subsets of policies. The absence of a risk–coverage 
correlation in a universe of policies does not rule out the possibility of such a correlation in 
identifiable subsets of this universe. The results of Cohen (2005) point to a partitioning into 
subsets on the basis of policyholders’ experience, and future work may do well to explore other 
methods of partitioning as well.  
3. Failure by Policyholders to Use Private Information They Have 
For a risk-coverage correlation to come about, it does not suffice for policyholders to 
have private information about their risk type; they must also adjust their purchasing decisions 
on the basis of this information. Whereas policyholders who perfectly optimize their decisions 
would make such adjustments, behavioral economics suggests that individuals often fail to 
engage in perfect optimization, especially when the stakes are not high—as is the case, for 
example, with the choice of deductible levels in automobile insurance.  
Thus, a risk-coverage correlation may not come into being if policyholders routinely fail 
to act on private information that they have by altering their insurance purchases (at least for 
risks within the normal range). Hurd et al. (2002) conclude that elderly respondents could predict 
actual mortality fairly well, for example, but also found that despite this (except for the most 
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behavior in the way that economic theory would predict. That is, even when policyholders can 
make more accurate predictions than their insurers, they may not use these predictions in their 
insurance-purchase decisions.  
As Pauly et al. (2003) note, “[r]eal consumers . . . have more on their minds than paying 
attention to small bargains in insurance markets.” In fact, Pauly et al. conclude that demand for 
life insurance is insensitive to changes in either price or risk, especially the latter. Their estimate 
of coverage elasticity with respect to mortality risk was only about 0.2 to 0.5. Therefore, even 
when individuals can predict their own risk better than their insurers can, they may simply fail to 
act on their advantage by increasing the amount of insurance they buy. 
4. Superior Information or Predictive Ability by Insurers? 
Another possible reason for the absence of a positive correlation between risk and 
quantity of insurance purchased is that insurers may actually possess better information about a 
policyholder’s risk than the policyholder does. (Chiappori and Salanié (2000)). Insurers’ risk 
classification or underwriting is done using a combination of subjective and objective/actuarial 
techniques. Even if the policyholder knows things about him or herself that the insurer does not, 
the insurer may nevertheless be in a better position to forecast risk (using the variables it does 
know) than the policyholder, if it uses a superior forecasting method. 
Although not directly concerned with insurance, Grove and Meehl’s (1996) survey of 
“clinical” vs. “statistical” prediction lends support to this view. Noting that “[h]umans simply 
cannot assign optimal weights to variables, and they are not consistent in applying their own 
weights,” the authors surveyed 136 studies that compared experts’ predictive judgments with 
those made by a simple actuarial or statistical model. In more than half of the cases, in a wide 
variety of settings—criminal recidivism, college grade point averages, firm bankruptcies—the 
simple mechanical model made better predictions than the experts’ subjective (“clinical”) 
judgments. In the remaining cases, the two methods performed equally well, and the experts 
almost never outperformed the actuarial prediction.  
Consider information about an individual’s credit score (a single number that summarizes 
his or her credit history). Whether or not there is a bio-psychological basis for the correlation 
between credit scores and risk (Brocket and Golden, 2007), the relationship seems remarkably 
robust. An insurer who knows a policyholders’ credit score (and the robust relationship between 
it and, for example, accident risk) may actually be able to predict a policyholder’s riskiness 
  22better than she or he could, even if the policyholder has superior information about some aspects 
of his or her own behavior.
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B. Offsetting  Factors:  Interaction between Risk and Characteristics Associated with 
Increased Purchase of Insurance 
Adverse selection theory focuses on individuals’ incentive to purchase more insurance 
when they know that they face higher risks. Thus far, we have focused on reasons why 
policyholders may not have, or may fail to use, superior information vis-à-vis the insurer. We 
now ask why the data may not elicit a risk–coverage correlation even when policyholders have 
private information and are able to use it. In particular, we discuss the possibility of factors that 
would by themselves yield a negative correlation between risk and coverage and, thus, may 
“offset” the positive risk–coverage correlation that adverse selection would produce if it were on 
its own. We begin by discussing the possibility that risk is correlated with risk aversion, which, 
other things being equal, leads to increased purchase of insurance; then we discuss the possibility 
that risk is correlated with other variables associated with increased insurance demand.  
1. Interaction between Risk and Risk Aversion: Propitious Selection 
One reason why high risk may be correlated with increased insurance demand is that it 
may be correlated with low risk aversion. Hemenway (1990) was apparently the first to propose 
the term “propitious selection” to describe an observed negative relationship between insurance 
demand and riskiness. Based largely on anecdotal evidence, he concluded that high-risk 
individuals are less likely to purchase insurance because they are also less risk-averse. This 
mechanism leads to selection that is advantageous to insurers, since the insured population is less 
risky than the population as a whole.  
DeMeza and Webb (2001) provide an elegant theoretical model based on the same idea: 
cautious people put more effort into preventing accidents and are also more likely to buy 
insurance. Using a model that combines moral hazard and selection, De Donder and Hindricks 
(2006) suggest that propitious selection cannot account for a negative correlation between 
insurance purchase and riskiness, at least when the costs of precaution are exclusively monetary. 
To obtain the negative correlation, they say, one must find not only that the more risk-averse take 
more precautions than the less risk-averse, but also that the less risk-averse exhibit decreasing 
                                                 
23 We assume throughout this survey that the positive correlation between risk and coverage is conditional 
on the menu of coverage offered by the insurer, which is often designed to induce policyholders to reveal 
h/is or her type. The question is whether there is additional private information that can not be revealed by 
the choice of coverage. 
  23willingness to pay for insurance, which they argue is impossible in equilibrium.
24 Karagyozova 
and Siegelman (2007) use simulation techniques to conclude that with a continuum of types, 
even a very large negative correlation between risk aversion and riskiness cannot prevent the 
unraveling of the market in the presence of asymmetric information (for reasonable values of 
risk-aversion).  
Although the ability of propitious selection models to explain the absence of adverse 
selection remains an open question, there is some empirical support for a positive correlation 
between financial and non-financial risk aversion across individuals, which is what drives these 
models. Guiso and Paiella (2003, 2005) survey individuals and construct a direct measure of 
financial risk aversion from the amount that respondents say they would be willing to pay to 
enter a hypothetical lottery. They find that this measure is correlated with choice of job, 
remaining in one’s region of birth, and suffering from a chronic disease. “Overall,” they 
conclude, “the evidence . . . implies that attitudes towards [financial] risk have considerable 
explanatory power for several important . . . [nonfinancial] decisions.” Barsky et al. (1997) use a 
broadly similar survey methodology and find a similar pattern, although with weaker explanatory 
power for financial risk aversion. Dohmen et al. (2005, 2007) also find a relationship between 
financial and non-financial risk aversion on the basis of survey data. Loewenstein et al. (2001, p. 
275) suggest that risk aversion is largely affective rather than cognitive and tends to be 
inconsistent across different contexts.  
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) propose that the absence of a positive correlation 
between riskiness and demand for long-term care insurance stems from multiple sources of 
heterogeneity among policyholders. That is, some have private information about riskiness while 
others have private information about their own risk aversion. If the first type are high-risk, they 
will use this information to increase the amount of insurance they purchase; if, however, the 
second type are predominantly low-risk (as empirically appears to be the case in the Finkelstein 
and McGarry data), they will be drawn into the insurance pool by their high risk aversion and 
may offset the negative effect of the high-risk policyholders’ participation. 
Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry (2008) seek to explain the “puzzling” absence of 
selection by investigating five different insurance markets: life, health (private acute care), 
                                                 
24 De Donder and Hindricks (2006) model the relationship between riskiness and investment in 
precautions as a moral hazard, such that insurance prompts the more risk-averse to purchase more 
insurance and take fewer precautions as a result. An alternative reading of Hemenway’s argument is that 
financial risk aversion is correlated with “non-financial risk aversion,” a psychological tendency to worry 
about physical or emotional risks and to take steps to avoid them. There is no reason that an enthusiastic 
skydiver or free climber could not simultaneously be risk-averse in the economic sense, although it seems 
implausible that physical daring would typically accompany the avoidance of financial risk. 
  24annuities, long-term care, and Medigap. Their results are consistent with the explanation that 
individuals may vary in their tolerance for risk in addition to their riskiness.
 Gathering data from 
different sources on insurance coverage, several measures of occurrence of risk, and risk 
tolerance,
25 they test how these three factors are related. They run unconditional and conditional 
bivariate relationships between two regressions: one that investigates the effect of different levels 
of risk tolerance on whether individuals purchase a specific type of insurance and one that 
examines the effect of different levels of risk tolerance on their measures of the occurrence of 
risk. Their analysis yields two main findings: first, individuals who engage in “risky behavior” or 
who do not take precautions to reduce risk are less likely to purchase any of the kinds of 
insurance studied. Second, these individuals tend to have higher expected claims for life 
insurance and long-term care insurance but have lower expected claims for annuities. For 
Medigap and acute care health insurance, no systematic relationship was found.  
2.  Interaction between Risk and Other Characteristics Associated with   
    the Tendency to Purchase Insurance  
In addition to a possible correlation between low risk and high risk-aversion, low risk 
may also be correlated with other variables associated with a greater tendency to purchase 
insurance (Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008)). Like the correlation between low risk and high 
risk-aversion, any such additional correlation may also contribute to advantageous selection, 
which may in turn counter the effects of adverse selection and lead to the absence of an 
observable risk–coverage correlation. 
Consider, for example, “cognitive ability.” Fang et al. (2008) show that US senior 
citizens who purchase Medigap insurance (a supplement to Medicare) spend roughly $4,000 per 
year  less on health care than those who do not purchase such policies. On the other hand, 
conditional on health, those covered by Medigap spend roughly $2,000 more than those not 
covered. Taken together, these results are starkly at odds with the positive–correlation test. The 
authors’ preferred explanation for the negative relationship between coverage and risk is that 
higher cognitive ability (as measured by several survey questions) is associated with both 
increased demand for insurance (because the more sophisticated are better able to understand the 
                                                 
25 For each type of insurance, they use a different measure of risk. For life insurance, the indicator is 
whether the individual died between 1992 and 2002. For acute private health insurance, they ask whether 
the individual reported any use of hospital services in the previous two years. For annuities, they look at 
whether the individual survived from 1995 to 2002. For Medigap, they study expenses reported in 1995, 
and for long-term care they ask whether the individual entered a nursing home. To assess risk tolerance, 
they use five behaviors: smoking, drinking, occupational mortality risk, receipt of preventive health care, 
and use of seat belts. 
  25need for insurance or better able to understand the complex rules governing the Medicare 
program) and better health (because the more sophisticated take better care of themselves).  
Similarly, an important point raised in many annuity studies and several long-term care 
insurance studies is the possibility of selection on grounds other than mortality risk. The apparent 
absence of selection in life insurance and its presence in annuities seems hard to explain if 
selection is based (only) on the policyholder’s superior knowledge of his or her mortality risk; in 
this case, policyholders who know they will die sooner than their insurer believes should prefer 
to buy life insurance and those who know they will live longer than their insurer believes should 
prefer annuities.  
Several papers find evidence of selection in insurance purchases that appears to be based 
on wealth or income, education, or socio-economic status (e.g., Finkelstein and Poterba, 2006). 
A positive relationship between income and the decision to purchase insurance may explain the 
different selection results between annuities and life insurance. Higher income is negatively 
associated with mortality risk and positively associated with insurance purchases of all kinds. 
This means that demand for life insurance is driven by conflicting factors—higher income on the 
one hand, higher mortality risk on the other—that may partly cancel each other out. (This 
conclusion is strengthened by Pauly et al. (2003)’s finding of low risk-elasticity of insurance 
demand.) The net result would be that life-insurance purchasers strongly resemble the population 
at large. In contrast, higher incomes and lower mortality risks drive selection toward annuity 
purchases, and these two factors work in the same direction, with the result being that annuitants 
outlive the population at large.  
C. Institutional and Regulatory Factors  
  Policyholders’ decisions about whether to buy insurance (and if so, how much) may also 
depend on “institutions,” an admittedly imprecise term (Finkelstein and Poterba (2006)). For 
example, in many contexts, insurance is not sold directly to consumers but is intermediated by 
“producers,” brokers or agents whose job it is to match customers with insurance providers and 
with particular policies and coverage. Cummins and Doherty (2006) argue that one justification 
for having such intermediaries—and, in particular, for paying them in a way that hinges on the 
profitability of the business that they place with an insurer—is that they can mitigate information 
asymmetries and adverse selection. (For a contrary view, see Schwarcz (2007).) If Cummins and 
Doherty are correct, then cross-industry or cross-national differences in the structure of insurance 
intermediaries may account for some of the previously described heterogeneity in adverse 
selection. Since few if any of the studies surveyed above provide significant details on the 
presence or absence of institutions of this kind, it is difficult to know whether such institutions 
actually play a significant role in explaining observed differences in selection.  
  26The rubric of “institutions” should also include the way that insurance is advertised or 
marketed to the public, which is often tightly controlled by national or subnational regulation. 
For example, many countries allow insurers to market health and life insurance by offering 
lottery tickets as an enticement (Baker and Siegelman, forthcoming). Such marketing techniques 
appear especially effective in recruiting certain groups who tend to under–purchase insurance—
especially the young—and hence may offset selective pressures that might otherwise materialize. 
The cliché that “life insurance is sold and not bought” suggests that regulations governing 
permissible sales practices may have a significant effect on selection pressures: Since insurers 
are reluctant to sell to customers who are eager to buy (presumptively the worst risks), the extent 
of sales to good risks is likely to be constrained by restrictions on marketing techniques. 
The presence or availability of alternative forms of insurance may also play a role in 
selection for a given type of insurance. Universal health insurance, for example, may limit 
selection in demand for annuities by eliminating a major source of expense for older people 
while leaving demand for life insurance relatively unchanged.
26  
It is also important to realize that risk classification by insurers is heavily regulated in 
almost all jurisdictions. Life insurers in the US are forbidden both by civil-rights laws and 
insurance regulations from using race in setting premiums, even though race is predictive of 
longevity and had been used in the past (Paltrow (2001)). Health insurers may not use “pre-
existing conditions,” auto insurers are barred from relying on “credit scores” in some 
jurisdictions, and so on. Under such circumstances, individuals who know that they are high-risk 
will have an added incentive to purchase high coverage. This kind of selection is not brought 
about by asymmetric information. Instead, it is attributable to the insurer’s not using its full 
information in a way that leads to the cross-subsidization of some insurance policies at the 
expense of others. This is the mechanism that Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) describe in the UK 
annuities market, where insurers fail to use policyholders’ residential addresses in setting 
premiums even though address does predict mortality risk. 
                                                 
26 Or, as De Donder and Hindricks (2006) point out, social insurance available at a pooled rate may 
exacerbate selection in supplemental private-insurance markets through differential effects of the “free” 
social insurance on the moral hazard of high- and low-risk insureds. A similar argument is made by Sil 
(2005), who found that futures markets, which serve as insurance for growers who participate in them, 
exacerbate adverse selection in the market for crop insurance. 
  27V. DISENTANGLING ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD 
A. The Problem 
In the preceding section we considered why the data may not reveal a coverage–risk 
correlation despite the presence of adverse selection. We now discuss the possibility that adverse 
selection may not exist despite the presence of a coverage–risk correlation. In particular, such a 
correlation may arise even in the absence of adverse selection due to moral hazard.   
Unlike adverse selection, which has to do with “hidden information,” moral hazard has to 
do with “hidden action.” The risk of an accident and the losses it produces may be a product not 
only of the policyholder’s (unalterable) “type” but also of his or her behavior. A policyholder 
may invest in precautions that reduce the probability or the size of the loss. The purchase of 
insurance diminishes the policyholder’s incentives to invest in such precautions because the 
insured policyholder no longer captures their full benefits, at least part of which accrue to the 
insurer instead.  
The presence of moral hazard provides an important reason for the use of deductibles in 
insurance contracts. (See Harris and Raviv (1978), Hölmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979), and 
survey by Winter (2000); Baker (1996) provides an intellectual history of moral hazard in the 
insurance industry.)
27 If an insurance policy covers the full loss, the policyholder has no 
incentive to take precautions; a deductible restricts the payout to only part of the loss, thereby 
giving the policyholder an incentive to take precautions. The higher the share of loss covered 
(the lower the deductible), the lower the level of precaution and, in turn, the higher the expected 
value of a policyholder’s loss.
28  
Thus, the presence of moral hazard can be expected to produce a correlation between 
coverage and losses, with all known observables controlled for. This coverage–risk correlation 
is, of course, predicted by adverse selection as well. In the adverse selection story, the correlation 
originates from the choice of lower deductibles by riskier insureds. In the moral-hazard story, the 
correlation results from lower deductibles that lead to lower levels of caution and, in turn, higher 
risks.  
                                                 
27 When more than one loss may occur during the life of a policy, moral-hazard considerations may call 
for having a deductible for each loss and not just a deductible applying to the aggregate losses during the 
life of the policy. See Cohen (2006). 
28 Research on moral hazard has long distinguished between ex ante moral hazard, which refers to the 
tendency of policyholders to take reduced precautions, and ex post moral hazard, which refers to 
policyholders’ actions after a loss occurs. (See, for example, Dionne and St-Michel (1991).) The 
discussion in this section focuses largely on ex ante moral hazard. 
  28The finding (in cross-sectional data, and conditional on observables) that coverage is 
correlated with risk is consistent with either adverse selection or moral hazard. Thus, by itself, 
the observation of such a correlation does not suffice to tell us whether it is caused by adverse 
selection alone, moral hazard alone, or both. The disentanglement of adverse selection and moral 
hazard is probably the most significant and difficult challenge that empirical work on adverse 
selection in insurance markets faces. Below we discuss three approaches to this challenge, based 
respectively on randomized and natural experiments, the dynamics of insurance contracts, and 
the interaction of the coverage–risk correlation and policyholder characteristics.  
We abstract below from the significant literature testing for the presence of moral hazard 
in contexts that do not involve individual choice among insurance contracts. This literature 
identifies a moral hazard effect in some contexts but not in others. Kaestner and Carroll (1997) 
and Fortin and Lanoie (2000), for example, find that more generous coverage of workers’ 
compensation is associated with more workplace injuries. Cohen and Dehejia (2004) find that 
increases in the incidence of automobile insurance and changeovers to no-fault liability systems 
have significant negative effects on traffic fatalities. Klick and Stratmann (2007) find that 
diabetics in the US exhibit higher BMIs (body/mass indices) after their states pass laws 
mandating health insurance coverage of medical treatment for diabetics. Cohen and Einav 
(2003), however, find no evidence of a connection between increased use of seatbelts and riskier 
driving.  
B. Randomized Experiments and Natural Experiments  
When insurance coverage of a set of policyholders changes for exogenous reasons—a 
randomized experiment or a natural experiment—it is reasonable to assume that the change 
affects only the policyholders’ behavior and not their underlying risk. Therefore, insofar as the 
coverage changes lead to changes in policyholders’ losses (and as long as the changes are solely 
due to exogenous factors and not to policyholders’ choices), such a pattern may be explained by 
moral hazard but not by adverse selection.  
Manning et al. (1987) used the RAND Health Insurance Experiment to test whether 
individuals who were randomly assigned more coverage chose higher levels of spending. The 
study found evidence consistent with ex post moral hazard: individuals in plans with more 
coverage spent more on health care and, therefore, were more costly to their insurer.  
Since randomized experiments are often impossible or, at least, quite expensive to 
conduct, researches often take advantage of natural or quasi-natural experiments such as changes 
brought about by new regulations and policies. Chiappori, Durand, and Geoffard (1998) 
exploited such an exogenous change in French health insurance: the replacement of full coverage 
with a 10% copayment in 1994. This change could reasonably have been expected to affect the 
  29incentives of policyholders, without changing the composition of the insured pool. The study 
found moral hazard in some dimensions of health insurance use but not in others. In particular, 
the introduction of the copayment had no effect on doctor office visits but did have an effect on 
doctor home visits.  
Cardon and Hendel (2001) use data from the 1987 Natural Medical Expenditure Survey 
(NMES), including all health policies offered by employers to each of their employees, and the 
policy the worker actually chose. In the data, employees working for the same firm are offered 
the same menu, although employees from different firms face widely different choice sets. 
Insofar as employees do not select employers on the basis of the health-insurance menus that the 
employer offers, the situation examined by the authors is one in which employees with similar 
characteristics choose different contracts for exogenous reasons. To test for adverse selection, 
Cardon and Hendel examine similar employees who face the same set of choices. To test for 
moral hazard, they examine similar employees who face different coinsurance rates, with price 
sensitivity identified using the coinsurance variability across individuals. While they find no 
evidence of adverse selection, they do find price elasticities that are negative and close to those 
obtained in the RAND survey. The authors conclude that moral hazard, rather than adverse 
selection, is likely to be the main consequence of asymmetric information in their data. 
Finally, Dionne et al. (2005) focus on a 1992 change by Quebec’s monopoly public 
insurer in the sale of drivers’ insurance against bodily injuries caused to others. The change was 
such that the insurer began increasing the premiums that it charged to drivers who accumulated 
demerit points through traffic violations. Consistent with moral hazard, the change was 
associated with a reduction in accidents.  
C. Dynamic Properties  
Another approach to distinguishing between moral hazard and adverse selection is based 
on dynamic properties of the two conditions, since moral hazard and adverse selection generate a 
different relationship between past and future risks. Abbring et al. (2003a, 2003b) provide a 
model that explains how dynamic data can help in distinguishing moral hazard from adverse 
selection. Insurance contracts often make premiums dependent on the policyholder’s prior claim 
history. Under commonly used forms of the “bonus-malus” system, the cost of an accident in 
terms of future premiums depends on the number of previous accidents. Given this feature of 
insurance contracts, moral hazard should lead to a negative correlation between prior claims and 
accidents in a subsequent year. Under adverse selection, in contrast, prior claims reflect a 
policyholder’s risk type; therefore, we should expect a positive correlation between past and 
future claims. Abbring et al. (2003b) apply this approach to data from France, where all insurers 
  30are required by regulation to use a bonus-malus system, and they find no evidence of moral 
hazard. A critical aspect of their approach is control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
Israel (2007) follows the approach of Abbring et al. (2003a, b), using ten-year tracking 
data from a private automobile insurer in Illinois on 30,000 policyholders. In the market that he 
studies, a driver’s experience rating is based only on his or her claims history in the previous 
three years. As a result, after three years, each claim drops off the policyholder’s record and 
changes the policyholder’s position in the experience rating scheme, irrespective of whether any 
claim is submitted at that time. This feature of the data allows the researcher to isolate moral 
hazard without using restrictive assumptions about state dependence, as in Abbring et al. 
(2003a). The study finds a small but statistically significant evidence of moral hazard. But the 
effect disappears when state dependence is not controlled for, which highlights the importance of 
controlling for state dependence.  
Another study that focuses on dynamics is Dionne et al. (2006), which uses a longitudinal 
sample of French automobile insurance policies during the period from 1995-1997. The dataset 
has the advantage of including both the number of accidents and the number of claims made by 
the policyholder. This allows the authors to base their test on actual accidents, rather than claims, 
with two advantages. First, using actual accident data provides for superior estimation of 
policyholders’ risks. Moreover, the panel structure also allows the researchers to follow 
policyholders who switch to another insurer. The paper proposes a dynamic causality test for the 
separation of moral hazard from learning and adverse selection. The study finds asymmetric 
learning among policyholders with five or fewer years of driving experience, moral hazard in the 
group of policyholders with less than fifteen years of experience, and no residual information 
problem for policyholders with more than 15 years of experience. The authors attribute this 
result to the fact that, under the French system of bonus-malus, older policyholders have the 
strongest incentives for safe driving because a large portion of these policyholders have the 
maximum bonus-malus socio and they are motivated to stay there. 
D. Interaction of the Coverage–Risk Correlation with Policyholder Characteristics and Behavior  
Finally, a third approach to untangling moral hazard and adverse selection utilizes a 
static, single-period analysis but focuses on disaggregating the coverage–risk correlation in ways 
that can help distinguish between the two explanations for the correlation. This approach is 
pursued by Cohen (2005), who, after finding a coverage–risk correlation in the set of all policies 
sold to an insurer’s new customers, goes on to show that the identified correlation interacts with 
policyholder characteristics in a way that is easier to explain under adverse selection than under 
moral hazard. In particular, the study shows that the correlation exists only for policyholders who 
have three or more years of driving experience. Consistent with adverse selection, this pattern 
  31may be explained by customers’ obtaining private information about their risk type only after 
amassing some driving experience. In contrast, moral hazard can not readily explain this pattern 
unless one argues that expected losses from accidents are sensitive to precautions taken by 
experienced drivers, but not those taken by new drivers.  
Furthermore, the study shows that there is some underreporting of prior claims by new 
customers with previous driving experience. Because the insurer cannot tell which new 
customers under–report, this pattern provides direct evidence that at least some new customers 
have private information about their risk type. In contrast, such underreporting is not part of a 
moral hazard story in which customers with different coverage levels present different risks due 
to different behavior (as opposed to different risk types that they had before they bought the 
policies).  
VI. LEARNING OVER TIME 
Adverse selection involves asymmetric information between policyholders and insurers 
with respect to policyholders’ risk types. Such information is not static. Over time, both 
policyholders and insurers may learn information about policyholders’ risk types. In this section, 
we review the evidence about the existence and consequences of such learning.
29  
Studying the life-insurance market, Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) provide strong evidence of 
the existence and significance of learning over time. Their focus is on symmetric learning, in 
which both policyholders and insurers gradually gain new information about the policyholder’s 
risk of mortality. In this setting, purchasing a new contract each year, with no renewal 
commitment on the part of either the insurer or the policyholder, would leave policyholders with 
an uninsured risk of being reclassified into a high-risk category in the future and having to pay 
the resulting high premium. Insuring against this risk is addressed by long-term contracts with a 
commitment to renew on the part of the insurer but not the policyholder; the problem of future 
defection by policyholders who learn that they have higher-than-average mortality risk is 
checked by the front-loading of premiums. The Hendel-Lizzeri study finds evidence that is 
consistent with such front-loading and the resulting partial lock-in of consumers, the predicted 
response to learning over time in this context.  
Finkelstein, McGarry, and Sufi (2005) find evidence in support of the Hendel-Lizzeri 
findings using US data on long-term care insurance, a market that also involves learning about 
mortality risk over time. The study shows that long-term care insurance contracts also involve 
                                                 
29  We abstract from studies (Crawford and Shum (2005) and Israel (2005a, 2005b)) of learning by 
policyholders about the quality of their insurer’s service, learning that does not involve information about 
policyholders’ risk types. 
  32substantial front-loading, with policyholders paying initial premiums that exceed their actuarial 
costs to the insurer. The study also provides evidence that policyholders who drop their coverage 
are subsequently less likely to use a nursing home, and that the dropping of coverage is at least 
partly a response to positive information about the policyholder’s health situation. 
These studies show the existence of learning about risk types, but they focus on 
symmetric learning that has no effect on any information asymmetry that may exist between 
policyholders and insurers. Learning need not be symmetric, however. Some information may 
reach only some but not all agents in the market and, therefore, may affect the presence of 
adverse selection. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that such learning takes place.  
In particular, experience may allow policyholders to amass information that allows them 
to gain an advantage over their insurer. Studying a market in which there is no information 
sharing among insurers, Cohen (2005) shows the existence of learning by policyholders. In 
particular, by finding a coverage–risk correlation among new customers with three or more years 
of driving experience but uncovering no such correlation among new customers with less driving 
experience, and by also finding that new customers underreport their prior claims histories, the 
study shows that prior learning by customers can be relevant to the existence of adverse selection 
and coverage–risk correlation.
30
Given that policyholders with driving experience can underreport prior claims when 
switching to a new insurer and insofar as insurance policies are for one term only, each insurer 
has an informational advantage over its rivals with respect to its repeat customers. Such an 
information asymmetry among insurers provides each of them with market power vis-à-vis its 
current customer base. This market power, and the higher profits it may facilitate, offer another 
dimension for empirical work that seeks to identify learning.  
In the auto-insurance market, D’Arcy and Doherty (1990) show that, consistent with 
learning by insurers about their repeat customers, insurers contractually forbid their agents from 
selling private information about customer records to rival insurers, and that entry into the 
insurance market is costly. The study also demonstrates that the longer various policyholder 
cohorts remain with the company, the less profit the company makes on them. However, the 
authors lacked data that would allow them to control for differences in policyholder 
characteristics other than experience with the company and, therefore, could not rule out the 
                                                 
30 Israel (2006) obtains results similar to those of Cohen (2005) using data from the US. Studying a pool 
of an insurer’s new customers who bought more than the legally required minimum insurance, the study 
finds coverage–risk correlation only among “informed consumers,” defined as consumers who are more 
than forty years old when joining the insurer. 
  33possibility that the compared cohorts of policyholders differed in aspects other than their 
experience with the company. 
Cohen (2008) uses a panel dataset of repeated contracting that includes all information 
that the insurer has about each policyholder, including information relevant to assessing the 
policyholder’s risk and calculating the insurer’s profits on each customer. The study yields three 
findings that are consistent with the insurer’s having private information about repeat customers 
that rival insurers do not share. First, the insurer makes higher profits on repeat customers. And, 
more importantly, these higher profits are driven by profits made on customers who have good 
records with the insurer. If a repeat customer with a good claims record with the insurer were to 
switch to a rival, the rival might be uncertain about his or her quality; this state of affairs 
provides the insurer with some information-based market power over those customers who have 
a good record. Furthermore, the longer the period over which the customer has a good record, the 
higher the profits made by the insurer.  
Second, the study finds that the insurer’s higher profits on repeat customers with good 
claims records are due to its ability to charge such customers a higher premium than their low 
risk justifies. While the insurer charges low-risk repeat customers lower premiums, the reduction 
in premium is smaller than the reduction in costs (insurance payouts) associated with such repeat 
customers. Finally, consistent with the insurer’s possession of private information about repeat 
customers’ risk type, the study finds that customers with poor claim records tend to leave the 
insurer while those with good records tend to stay for another term. Customers with a bad claims 
history have an incentive to flee their record and pool with customers who leave their insurers 
because of exogenous shocks.  
It is worth noting that the analysis of learning about repeat customers applies only to the 
(many) insurance markets in which policies are issued for one term only. Building on earlier 
theoretical work (Dionne and Lasserre (1985), Cooper and Hayes (1987)), Dionne and Doherty 
(1994) show that it may be advantageous for insurers facing adverse selection to commit to offer 
policyholders an option to renew their policies at a specified price, and they provide evidence 
consistent with such behavior on the basis of automobile-insurance data from California.  
It should also be stressed that the ability of insurers to obtain an informational advantage 
over their rivals with respect to repeat customers depends on the extent to which there are 
systems—resulting from regulation, contract, or otherwise—for information-sharing among 
insurers. Such requirements may eliminate the underreporting of prior claims by experienced 
drivers who join a new insurer. The desirability of information-pooling systems has been much 
debated in Europe, where the European Commission ruled that some systems of information 
sharing are anticompetitive (de Garidel-Thoron (2005)).  
  34In the U.S., some information about accident history is maintained in state records, but it 
has long been observed (e.g., by D’Arcy and Doherty (1990)) that the publicly available 
information is highly incomplete and that a new insurer would not be able to cull from it a 
complete claims history of other insurers’ customers. A lawsuit that reached the US Supreme 
Court focused on an attempt by several large insurers and reinsurers to force the Commercial 
General Liability insurance industry to use standard forms, and it was suggested by some that 
this attempt was partly motivated by a desire to make experience-sharing easier.
31 Future 
empirical work should try to identify the consequences of information-sharing systems.  
It deserves emphasis that, even though information-sharing systems can eliminate the 
underreporting of prior claims to a new insurer, they do not necessarily eliminate all types of 
asymmetric learning. In particular, driving experience may provide policyholders with 
information about their risk type that is not fully reflected in claims records—for example, 
information about accidents that were narrowly avoided by the policyholder or the policyholder’s 
driving ability. Whether such learning is significant is another interesting subject for future 
empirical research. Cohen and Einav (2007) provide some evidence suggesting that the incidence 
of accidents that are unreported because the level of damages is just below the deductible is not 
large, but there may be many accidents that were narrowly avoided or that ended with very 
minor damage.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the first decade following the appearance of Rothschild and Stiglitz’s seminal paper, 
work on adverse selection was largely theoretical. Since then, empirical work has done an 
impressive job of catching up, so that most research on adverse selection in insurance markets in 
the past decade has been empirical.  
We have examined a large number of studies that test the basic coverage–risk correlation 
predicted by adverse selection across a wide range of insurance markets. Although the studies 
yield different findings about the existence of the coverage–risk correlation, we argued that the 
fact that the correlation is found by some studies and not by others does not indicate that work in 
this area is still at an inconclusive stage, or that more consistent results should be expected to 
appear over time. Rather, our assessment of the work in this area is that there is a good basis for 
expecting the existence of adverse selection and a coverage–risk correlation to vary across 
markets and, indeed, even across segments of the same market. What we should expect empirical 
work to provide in this area, then, is not a once-and-for-all answer to the question about whether 
adverse selection exists but rather an ever-improving understanding of the circumstances under 
                                                 
31 See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), and, for commentary, Ayres and 
Siegelman (1989). 
  35which a coverage–risk correlation should and should not be expected to arise. We have sought in 
this paper to advance this objective by providing a classification of reasons why a coverage–risk 
correlation may not exist and a framework for thinking about them.  
Our conclusions have important implications for policy discussions in this area. Such 
discussions should not be based on a general assumption that adverse selection and the 
coverage–risk correlation may be expected to exist generally in insurance markets, nor should 
they rely on studies that fail to find such a correlation to suggest the opposite general 
assumption. Policy discussions should try to tailor themselves to the specific insurance market 
under consideration, recognizing that adverse selection and coverage–risk correlations vary 
across insurance markets (and even among pools of risks within a market), and that they do so in 
ways that are at least somewhat predictable on the basis of existing research.  
One important direction for subsequent work is to further study and understand the 
factors that cause the coverage–risk correlation to arise in some circumstances but not in others. 
More work is warranted with respect to disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection and 
with respect to learning over time. Furthermore, transcending the question of when and to what 
extent adverse selection occurs, future research should examine the consequences of adverse 
selection, when it occurs, for the supply and purchase of insurance and, in turn, for efficiency 
and welfare.
32 As researchers gain better and better access to comprehensive datasets that allow 
them to perform tests that they could not have performed earlier, we hope that significant 
progress will be made in all of these directions in the years to come.  
 
                                                 
32 A recent study that moves in this direction is Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2007). They estimate 
that adverse selection causes a welfare loss of about 2% of annual premiums in the UK annuities market. 
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Data 
Description 













Two-stage structural model in 
which policyholders choose 
from available insurance 







Most of variance in claims is explained by 







and Health and 
Retirement Survey. 
US: 2000–2002 
OLS regressions of medical 
spending on dummy for 
presence of Medigap 
insurance plus extensive 
controls. 
Yes  Yes, but no 
adverse 
selection 
Those with Medigap insurance spend $4,000 
less than those without; but conditional on 
observable health status, those with insurance 
spend $1,900 more. Medigap purchasers have 
better health than non-purchasers. Cognitive 
differences between purchasers and non-
purchasers account for selection. 
Crop Insurance 
Just, et al 
(1999) 
Several hundred corn 
and soybean farmers 
from national sample. 
US: 1988 
Decomposition of insurance 
purchase incentives into 
subsidy, risk aversion and 
informational advantage 
components based on 
parametric model of crop 
yields. 









For both crops, risk aversion is a relatively 
unimportant motive for insurance purchases. 
Both insured and uninsured farmers would lose 
money on insurance purchases were it not for 




60,000 corn farmers. 
Iowa (US): 1987–97. 
Multinomial logit prediction 
of choice among various 
insurance coverage 
controlling for risk 
Unclear  Yes  High-risk farmers are more likely to select 
broader revenue-based rather than yield-based 
insurance and to purchase more coverage. 
Sil (2005)  Agric. Resource 
Management Survey 
data for corn and 
soybean growers. 
Indiana (US) 
Logistic predictions of effect 
of having a forward contract 
on probability of loss, and on 
the choice of insurance 
coverage. 
Probably yes  Yes  Policyholders with forward contracts have a 6% 
higher risk and choose more generous forms of 
insurance coverage. 
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